Why do employers give discretion? Family versus performance concerns by Ortega, Jaime
   
 
  
               
              
    
  
                     
Why Do Employers Give Discretion? Family 
Versus Performance Concerns
 
JAIME ORTEGA*
 
Using a large data set of Western European employees, I examine two sets of
reasons behind employers’ decisions to give discretion: performance concerns
(firms give discretion in order to improve performance) and family concerns
(firms wish to improve the employees’ work–family balance). I find more
support for the former than for the latter. Discretion is positively related to the
use of “high-performance” work practices and to employee position and ability,
and is smaller in larger establishments, which suggests that loss of control matters
to employers. Evidence about family concerns is less compelling. Female
participation in the labor force has a positive effect on discretion over work
schedules, but women have less discretion than men, and employees with small
children do not have more discretion than other employees. Large and governmental
organizations, which are expected to care more about work–family balance, do
not offer more discretion over work schedules than other types of organizations.
 
Introduction
 
T
 
he literature on so-called high-performance work systems
 
 (HPWS)
(Appelbaum et al. 2000; Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi 1997; Osterman
1994a, 2000) highlights the introduction of greater employee discretion
(also referred to as job autonomy, task control, or decision latitude) as one
of the key recent developments in human resource management practice.
Moreover, discretion regarding work hours and schedules has also been
important in the public and scholarly debate on work–family issues
(Golden 2001; Goodstein 1994; Osterman 1995; Wood, de Menezes, and
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Lasaosa 2003). This article examines why employers give discretion: Is it
because employees will be more productive, or to attenuate work–family
conflicts?
Research has largely focused on the consequences of  discretion. The
literature shows that, when adequately combined with other human resource
practices, employee discretion can have a sizeable effect on the volume, cost,
and quality of production (Appelbaum et al. 2000; Ichniowski and Shaw
1999). The positive effects on employee well-being and motivation have also
been extensively analyzed, mostly by psychologists (Karasek 1979; Parker
2003; Parker and Wall 1998; Singh 2000).
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 However, while the consequences
are relatively well understood, scholars have seldom looked at the determinants
of  discretion. This gap is important, because research on outcomes does
not necessarily speak to the question of why employers grant discretion:
Whether it is introduced for performance or work–family reasons, discretion
will arguably affect both performance and work–family balance.
The reasons why firms give discretion are important because they help us
predict how the allocation of discretion will be affected by policy changes
and by changes in the social or economic environment. If  performance
reasons are prevalent, we expect employee discretion to increase as foreign
competition increases and more producers in the developed countries turn
to high-quality strategies. However, if  work–family concerns prevail, we
expect demographic changes, changes in government support to families, or
changes in female labor force participation to influence employers’
decisions. Thus, it does not suffice to know whether discretion improves
performance or straightens out work–family conflicts: the reasons why dis-
cretion is granted have to be examined.
This paper uses micro data from the third European Working Conditions
Survey (EWCS), a large database collected in fifteen European Union
countries. The survey provides information about more than twelve thousand
individuals across all industries and occupations, and therefore allows for a
more complete picture of employee discretion than previously available.
Moreover, it has rich information about work characteristics and the
employees’ families, both of  which are necessary to identify whether dis-
cretion is granted as a way to increase performance or in order to improve
work–family balance. Finally, its international and cross-industry nature
makes it a very interesting source of information in a field where industry
or national studies prevail.
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 For example, research in that area has shown that discretion helps employees cope with role tension
(Singh 2000), and that negative effects of lean production on employee outcomes are largely due to
reduced employee discretion (Parker 2003).
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The Background section
provides a short review of the literature; the Theory section formulates the
hypotheses; the Data and Measurement section describes the relevant
variables and discusses measurement issues; the Results section presents the
results; and the Discussion and Conclusions section discusses the main
findings and concludes.
 
Background
 
Most researchers define employee discretion as the extent to which
employees can organize their own work by choosing the methods and/or the
scheduling of work.
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 The only study with evidence on the determinants of
both aspects of  discretion (methods and scheduling) is by Birkelund,
Goodman, and Rose (1996), who are concerned with male–female differences
in job characteristics and find no significant difference in discretion. Other
studies belong to two unrelated literatures that study one aspect or the other:
a literature on delegation and discretion over work methods (Moers 2006;
Nagar 2002; Osterman 1994b; Zoghi, Levenson, and Gibbs 2004), and a
larger literature that touches on flexible schedules in the wider context of
work–family issues (Golden 2001; Goodstein 1994; Osterman 1995; Wood
et al. 2003).
Studies on the literature on discretion over work methods take the view
that employers grant discretion over work methods in order to increase
performance. Nagar (2002) finds that branch managers have significantly
more discretion in high-growth, volatile, and innovative banks than in more
stable banks, which is consistent with the idea that discretion is used to take
advantage of managers’ specific knowledge. Zoghi et al. (2004) show that more
discretionary jobs tend to score high on three other job characteristics—
skill level, multitasking, and task interdependence—which also suggests
that performance concerns are important. However, none of these articles
tests for family concerns.
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 Different literatures use different terms to refer to discretion. Besides discretion, the most popular
terms are job autonomy, task control, and job decision latitude. The term job autonomy was coined and
made popular by Hackman and Oldham (1976) as part of their job characteristics model. Job decision
latitude was first introduced by Karasek (1979) in his job demand–job control model—a model that
often serves as a framework for the study of work-related stress. Karasek (1979) defines decision latitude
as “job control” or “discretion.” The distinction between work methods and work scheduling was first
made by Hackman and Oldham (1975, 1976), who defined autonomy as “the degree to which the job
provides substantial freedom, independence and discretion to the individual in scheduling the work and
in determining the procedures to be used in carrying it out.” Other authors (Appelbaum et al. 2000;
Jackson et al. 1993; Nagar 2002) use similar definitions.
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The second class of studies provides mixed evidence on the relative
importance of family and performance concerns. Goodstein (1994) studies
why companies offer work flexibility
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 and childcare benefits, and finds
evidence that an important motive is to gain social legitimacy, as predicted
by institutional theory. Osterman (1995) also examines the determinants of
various family-friendly policies, including flexible hours and childcare
benefits, but concludes that they are introduced to improve performance
within an HPWS strategy. Golden (2001) finds mixed evidence: women have
less flexibility than men (which contradicts the work–family view), but
married workers have more flexibility than single workers.
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Theory
 
Some think of discretion as a tool to increase performance, but for others
its purpose is to help workers balance their work and family lives. These
two views are not mutually exclusive, but have distinct implications for the
allocation of discretion, which I now describe.
 
Performance Concerns.
 
Employers may grant discretion because they
think that their employees’ knowledge will be more fully developed and
performance will improve (Osterman 1995; Wood et al. 2003). Within this
view, discretion is part of a wider HPWS, which usually includes team
production, job rotation schemes, and performance pay. Self-managed
production teams and offline problem-solving teams imply greater partici-
pation of nonmanagerial employees in decision making. Job rotation helps
employees gain a more thorough understanding of business, with which
they are able to exercise discretion in a more productive way, and the
introduction of performance-related pay seeks to ensure that employees’
preferences will be aligned with wider organizational goals. Therefore,
employees who participate in a HPWS are expected to have more discretion:
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 In that paper, job flexibility includes flextime, voluntarily reduced work time, job sharing, work at
home, flexible leave, and parental leave.
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 Others study the determinants of family-friendly management but do not include discretion as part
of those policies. Berg, Kalleberg, and Appelbaum (2003) find support for the view that HPWSs improve
work–family balance, but unlike Osterman (1995) do not provide evidence on the effect of HPWSs on
discretion over work schedules. Wood et al. (2003) test a few competing explanations, including the
institutional and HPWS views, for family-friendly policies; but do not consider flexible work schedules
as part of such policies. Their data provide some support for the “organizational adaptation” view
whereby organizations seek to gain social legitimacy but respond to social pressures in different ways
depending on management beliefs and perceptions and the needs of employees.
4
     
  
Hypothesis 1: 
 
Employees involved in a “high-performance” work system will have
more discretion
 
.
 
Performance concerns imply that more able employees will have more
discretion for two different reasons. First, those employees are more likely
to be promoted and to be assigned to positions that involve greater respon-
sibilities and more discretion.
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 The importance of promotions is consistent
with the job design literature, where discretion is treated as a “job char-
acteristic” (Hackman and Oldham 1976). Promotions are also important
according to the internal labor markets approach (Doeringer and Piore
1971), where jobs are relatively fixed and employers can only provide
different pay or working conditions by allocating employees to different
jobs. I therefore hypothesize that:
 
Hypothesis 2: 
 
Employees who have more subordinates will have more discretion
 
.
 
The second reason to expect a positive relationship between ability and
discretion is that, even within the same narrow occupation or job title,
employers can give more freedom to the employees that they consider to be
more capable. Therefore:
 
Hypothesis 3: 
 
Within a given position, employees of  higher ability will have
more discretion
 
.
 
Performance concerns also suggest that companies of different sizes will
allocate discretion differently. First, there is more division of labor in larger
organizations than in smaller ones, and therefore we expect less discretion
in the former than in the latter. Second, with discretion, firms lose some
control over their employees’ decisions, and this problem will be more
important in larger organizations where management has less information
about the decisions made at lower levels.
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 Hence I propose:
 
5
 
 According to Mintzberg (1979, pp. 79–80), “these jobs managers perform are so varied, and so
much switching is required among them in the course of any given day, that managerial jobs are typically
the least specialized in the organization.” (See also Drucker (1973, Chap. 32).) This “switching”
presupposes a high degree of discretion, both in terms of managing one’s time and of choosing the
methods with which to work, and as employees receive greater managerial responsibilities we naturally
expect them to enjoy greater discretion.
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 According to Drucker (1973, Chap. 54), “A big business has to organize properly the formal, the
objective structure. Relationships, information about people, and mobilization of individual energies
have to be built into a structure which, of necessity, has to be impersonal, based on policies, on objectives,
on abstract definitions of jobs and of contributions, and on the routines of procedures.” See also
Williamson (1975, Chap. 7), where informational asymmetries within firms are related to firm size; and
the comparison of large Route 128 companies versus smaller Silicon Valley companies made by Saxenian
(1994, Chap. 2).
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Hypothesis 4: 
 
Organizational size will have a negative effect on employee discretion
 
.
 
Family Concerns.
 
Employers may also give discretion as part of a policy
to help their employees balance family and work. Based on Wood et al.
(2003), we can distinguish four theories about family concerns: the institutional
theory, the organizational adaptation theory, the equal-opportunity
perspective, and the situational perspective.
These theories share the idea that rising levels of discretion are due to the
steady increase in the percentage of women in the workforce, which calls for
more flexible work arrangements. Moreover, the theories tend to focus on
discretion over work schedules, which is considered more important for
work–family balance than discretion over work methods. However, there
are some nuances. According to institutional theory, organizations conform
to social pressures in order to gain legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan 1977). In
the context of work–family issues, this would imply that employers give
more discretion to be socially accepted and trusted (Goodstein 1994; Wood
et al. 2003). In contrast, the other theories posit that firms respond to the
needs of their own employees (as opposed to external pressures). Thus, the
organizational adaptation view recognizes the importance of legitimation
but asserts that managers also take into account whether their own workforce
demands discretion. Workforce characteristics are also important in the
equal-opportunity perspective: employers are more likely to give discretion
when their own employees have stronger work–family conflicts, because in
those cases the lack of flexibility would have discriminatory effects for
employees with strong family commitments. In a similar way, the situational
or “practical response” perspective (Osterman 1995) posits that managers
follow a pragmatic approach and only give discretion when their own
employees demand it or expect it.
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Due to these nuances, these theories have different implications for
employee discretion. On the one hand, the institutional and, to some extent,
organizational adaptation perspectives imply that changes in the labor market
environment, notably the increasing labor force participation of women, will
exert pressure on organizations, leading to higher discretion levels. The differ-
ence between the two approaches is that in the latter employers react to social
pressures differently depending on the composition of their workforce. Hence:
 
Hypothesis 5: 
 
(a) The presence of women in the labor market will have a positive
influence on discretion over work schedules for all employees. (b) The presence of
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 According to this approach, discretion is not necessarily part of a broader strategy; instead, it is
introduced in a piecemeal way as a practical response to specific personnel problems.
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women in the labor market will have a positive influence on discretion over work
schedules for those employees who have more compelling family obligations
 
.
 
On the other hand, the organizational adaptation, equal-opportunity,
and situational perspectives posit that each firm will choose a different level
of discretion taking into account the employees’ needs. Therefore:
 
Hypothesis 6: 
 
Firms will grant more discretion over work schedules when employ-
ees have more compelling family obligations
 
.
 
Ownership plays an important role in institutional theory because public
employers and large private employers are expected to be more sensitive to
social pressures than small private employers.
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 I therefore propose:
 
Hypothesis 7: 
 
(a) Organizational size will have a positive effect on discretion
over work schedules; and (b) so will public ownership
 
.
 
The organizational adaptation perspective underlines the importance of
management attitudes toward employee requests. Managers with more open
attitudes have more thorough knowledge of their employees’ needs and greater
predisposition to introduce the organizational changes that are needed. Hence,
 
Hypothesis 8: 
 
Openness of management toward employee requests will have a
positive effect on employee discretion over work schedules
 
.
 
Finally, the equal-opportunity perspective considers family-friendly
practices as a way to provide equal opportunities for men and women, and for
employees with different family commitments. I hypothesize that companies
with more active antidiscrimination policies will grant more discretion over
work schedules. Moreover, if  such equal opportunity policies are successful,
I expect companies with more active policies to have less discrimination.
Therefore I propose:
 
Hypothesis 9: 
 
Discrimination in the workplace will be negatively related to employee
discretion over work schedules
 
.
 
Data and Measurement
 
The third European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS) was conducted
in 2000 by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and
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 Larger organizations have greater visibility, and failure to conform to social pressures would undermine
their social reputation. As far as public organizations are concerned, it is argued that politicians will
have an incentive to act according to their voters’ preferences and will therefore grant more discretion.
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Working Conditions (Paoli and Merllié 2001). It is based on personal
interviews and includes more than 21,000 individuals from fifteen Western
European countries, corresponding to a 56-percent response rate.
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 The sample
is comprised of government and non-government employees, and self-
employed individuals. Given that this research focuses on employee dis-
cretion, I exclude the latter and keep all (government and non-government)
employees. This restriction and the differences in response rates across
questions leave approximately twelve thousand usable observations. Details
of variables’ definitions and summary statistics are given in Tables 1 and 2.
 
Employee Discretion.
 
There are five questions on employee discretion,
which are summarized at the top of Table 2. Employees are asked whether
they can choose the order in which they conduct different tasks, the methods
with which they work, the speed or rate of work, the timing of breaks, and
the working hours. Given the positive correlation among those variables
and the fact that they all refer to relevant aspects of discretion,
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 I use a 0–
5 index, defined as the sum of the five discretion variables (Cronbach’s
alpha: 0.731). This index of discretion varies across countries and industries.
It is highest in Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands, and lowest in
Spain, Portugal, and Greece.
As far as industries are concerned, the index is highest in the financial
and real estate industries, and lowest in the food, textile, and land transporta-
tion industries. Most manufacturing industries are in fact below the average,
whereas most service industries are above the average.
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High-Performance Work Practices.
 
The survey includes questions on
teamwork, job rotation, vertical communication, continuous improvement,
and performance pay (see Table 2). All of them measure the respondent’s
involvement, rather than the frequency of those practices at the organizational
level. Performance pay, job rotation, and teamwork are defined in standard
ways and are captured by dummy variables. Vertical communication measures
whether employees can discuss aspects of work organization with their
superiors and is captured by a dummy variable based on the employee’s
 
9
 
 There are one thousand five hundred observations per country, with the only exception Luxembourg,
for which there are only five hundred observations. The fact that all countries were equally surveyed
implies that the smaller countries are over-represented in the sample, but the average levels of discretion
for the European Union practically do not change when the country weights are corrected. The com-
plete questionnaire is available in Paoli and Merllié (2001, Annex 1).
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 As noted above, previous research defines discretion as the extent to which employees can autono-
mously choose work methods and scheduling.
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 This is an interesting fact, given that most scholarly research on new work practices has focused
on manufacturing.
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TABLE 1
D
 
efinitions of the 
 
V
 
ariables
 
Variable Code Question(s) Type
1. Order Q.25.1 Are you able to choose or change your order of tasks? Dummy
2. Methods Q.25.2 Are you able to choose or change your methods of work? Dummy
3. Speed Q.25.3 Are you able to choose or change your speed or rate of 
work?
Dummy
4. Breaks Q.26.2 You can take your break when you wish. Dummy
5. Hours Q.26.4 You can influence your working hours. Dummy
6. Teamwork Q.27.b.2 Does your job involve doing all or part of your work in 
a team?
Dummy
7. Job rotation Q.27.b.1 Does your job involve rotating tasks between yourself 
and colleagues?
Dummy
8. Vertical 
communication
Q.30.b.2 Do you exchange views with your superiors about your 
working conditions in general or about the organization 
of your work when changes take place?
Dummy
9. Improvement Q.30.c.1 Do these exchanges of views lead to improvements at 
your own personal workplace?
Discrete 
0–3 index
Q.30.c.2 Do these exchanges of views lead to improvements in 
your office or factory?
Q.30.c.3 Do these exchanges of views lead to improvements in the 
organization as a whole?
10. Performance pay EF.22 If you are an employee, what does your remuneration 
include?
Dummy
2. Piece rate or productivity payments.
7. Payments based on the overall performance of the 
company (profit sharing scheme) where you work.
8. Payments based on the overall performance of a group.
9. Income from shares in the company you work for.
11. Subordinates Q.8 How many people work under your supervision, for 
whom pay increases, bonuses, or promotion depend 
directly on you?
Discrete 
0–3 index
12. Establishment size Q.7 How many people in total work in the local unit of the 
establishment where you work?
Discrete 
0–7 index
13. Firm tenure Q.3.a How many years have you been in your company or 
organization? (If less than one year) How many months?
Continuous
14. Job tenure Q.3.b How many years have you been in your present main job? 
(If less than one year) How many months?
Continuous
15. Age EF.11 How old are you? Continuous
16. Children EF.13 How many children under 15 are currently living at 
home?
Discrete 
0–4 index
17. Female EF.10 Sex Dummy
18. Household size EF.12 How many people live in your household, including 
yourself, all adults, and children?
Discrete 
0–5 index
19. Main income EF.19.b) Are you the person who contributes most to the 
household income?
Dummy
20. Housekeeper EF.19.a) Are you the person mainly responsible for ordinary 
shopping and looking after the home?
Dummy
9
  
 
   
21. Discrimination 
in establishment
Q.32 In the establishment where you work, are you aware of 
the existence of . . . ?
Discrete 
0–6 index
4. Sexual discrimination.
6. Age discrimination.
7. Discrimination linked to nationality.
8. Discrimination linked to ethnic background/race.
9. Discrimination linked to disability.
10. Discrimination linked to sexual orientation.
22. Discrimination 
against respondent
Q.31 Over the past 12 months, have you, or have you not been 
subjected at work to . . . ? (same items as in Q.32)
Discrete 
0–6 index
23. Women’s labor 
force participation
Eurostat Labor Force Survey Continuous
Variable Code Question(s) Type
 
TABLE 1 (cont.)
 
answer. Continuous improvement refers to whether such discussions lead to
actual improvements (see Table 1), and is measured through a 0–3 index
(Cronbach’s alpha: 0.741). Although there would be conceptual reasons to
do so, I do not construct an aggregate index of work practices because
TABLE 2
Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
1. Order 17,597 0.628 0.483 0 1
2. Methods 17,591 0.664 0.472 0 1
3. Speed 17,518 0.664 0.472 0 1
4. Breaks 17,616 0.556 0.497 0 1
5. Hours 17,566 0.379 0.485 0 1
6. Teamwork 17,575 0.620 0.485 0 1
7. Job rotation 17,598 0.479 0.500 0 1
8. Vertical communication 14,611 0.906 0.292 0 1
9. Improvement 13,007 2.073 1.111 0 3
10. Performance pay 17,731 0.114 0.318 0 1
11. Subordinates 17,632 0.285 0.743 0 3
12. Establishment size 17,731 4.338 2.014 0 8
13. Firm tenure 17,656 9.442 9.290 0.083 72
14. Job tenure 17,621 9.198 9.114 0.083 60
15. Age 17,731 37.772 11.104 15 65
16. Children 17,731 0.712 0.958 0 4
17. Female 17,731 0.473 0.499 0 1
18. Household size 17,727 1.961 1.328 0 5
19. Main income 17,705 0.616 0.486 0 1
20. Housekeeper 17,709 0.536 0.499 0 1
21. Discrimination in establishment 17,033 0.241 0.811 0 6
22. Discrimination against respondent 17,617 0.076 0.361 0 1
23. Women’s labor force participation  15 0.614 0.091 0.463 0.756
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Cronbach’s alpha is too low (0.328) for the five variables considered. The
correlations between the discretion variables and the high-performance
work practices are positive.
 
Employee Position within the Organization.
 
In addition to standard two-
digit occupational codes, the EWCS reports the number of subordinates,
classified in four intervals (no subordinates, 1–4, 5–9, and 10 or more), and
defined as “people that the employee supervises and whose pay increases,
bonuses, or promotions depend directly upon him.” Note that the question
does not refer to the number of direct subordinates—in fact, managers at
top positions have few direct subordinates—but the extent to which the
respondent has managerial responsibilities. The number of subordinates
defined in that way is positively correlated with all measures of discretion.
 
Employee Ability.
 
Ability is not directly observable, and the survey does
not have questions about educational attainment. However, information
about the employee’s tenure in the firm and tenure on the job can be used
to construct a proxy for ability. According to recent empirical evidence on
internal labor markets (Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom 1994; Seltzer and
Merrett 2000), there is a high correlation between time to promotion and
the probability of being promoted again in the future. This finding implies
that staying in the same job for a long time is a sign of “low ability,”
whereas staying for a short time can be regarded as a sign of “high ability.”
Thus, job tenure must be negatively correlated with ability, controlling for
age and tenure in the firm. I therefore use an interaction term between firm
tenure and job tenure to proxy for ability.
 
Organizational Size.
 
Establishments are classified into eight sizes, measured
by the number of employees.
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 The average person in the sample works in
an establishment with ten to forty-nine employees, and approximately 75
percent of individuals in the sample work in establishments with fewer than
100 employees.
 
13
 
 Establishment size is positively correlated with all measures
of discretion except one (breaks).
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 The eight categories are: No employee (apart from the respondent), 2–4, 5–9, 10–49, 50–99, 100–
249, 250–499, and 500 employees and over.
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 To check whether the EWCS distribution of establishment sizes is representative of the true distribution,
I have compared the EWCS distribution of establishments with census-based data from the Observatory
of European Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (2002). The EWCS distribution is consistent with
those data and with the fact that European firms are smaller than U.S. firms (see Mills, Thrasher, and
Fischer (2004) for the United States).
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Public Sector.
 
As noted below, the EWCS specifies the industry where
the employer’s main economic activity takes place. Based on this informa-
tion, I use a dummy variable equal to 1 when the employee works in the
public administration.
 
Labor Force Participation of Women.
 
I use official statistics from Eurostat’s
Labor Force Survey to construct the labor force participation variable. Since
this variable will be used to test institutional theory, and given that this perspec-
tive emphasizes the importance of social pressures at the macro level, I use the
national labor force participation averages (all referring to the year 2000)
instead of the regional rates. There is considerable variation in female participa-
tion, from 46.3 percent for Italy to 75.6 percent for Denmark. Moreover, female
participation is positively correlated with employee discretion across countries.
 
Family Obligations.
 
I use five proxies to measure the employees’ family
obligations. The first one is a female dummy. There is extensive evidence
that women spend much more time than men in housework and taking care
of children and elderly or disabled relatives. In particular, the EWCS con-
tains questions on the frequency with which employees take part in such
activities, and reveals great differences between men and women. Summary
statistics show that the difference in average male and female discretion is
very small (3 percentage points or less) for all measures of discretion except
breaks—the difference in discretion over breaks is 10 percentage points.
Moreover, its sign varies for different aspects of discretion: for the order
and methods of work, female discretion is higher than male discretion, but
for the other three aspects, average discretion is smaller for women than for
men. The second variable measures how many children below age fifteen live
with the employee, and takes on five possible values, from 0 (no children) to
4 (four or more children). The correlations between these two variables and
the various measures of  discretion are negative in some cases and positive
in other cases. The third variable measures the size of the household and takes
on six possible values, from 0 (the employee lives alone) to 5 (the employee lives
with five or more people). This variable is negatively correlated with all discretion
measures. The fourth variable is a dummy equal to 1 if  the respondent is
the main income earner in the household, and is positively correlated with
discretion. Last, the fifth variable is a dummy equal to 1 if  the respondent
is the main person responsible for shopping and taking care of the house. This
variable is positively correlated with all measures of discretion except breaks.
 
Openness of  Management.
 
The extent to which management has an
open attitude toward employees’ requests is measured with the vertical
12
     
 
communication and improvement variables described above (see paragraph
on high-performance work practices). Both variables are positively correlated
with all measures of discretion.
 
Discrimination.
 
Respondents report whether they have suffered discrimi-
nation over the last year (question 31), and also whether they are aware of
the existence of discrimination in their workplace (question 32). Six different
types of discrimination (based on sex, age, nationality, ethnic background
or race, disability, and sexual orientation) are considered. Since I want to
measure the presence of discrimination in the workplace, in most cases I use
the questions that refer to the establishment (question 32) instead of the
respondent (question 31). With those questions I define an index equal to
the sum of the six discrimination types (Cronbach’s alpha: 0.776). This
index is positively correlated with some measures of discretion (order and
methods), but negatively correlated with the rest (speed, breaks, and hours).
I also construct an analogous index measuring whether the respondent has
personally suffered discrimination (Cronbach’s alpha: 0.515).
 
Controls.
 
I use country, occupation, and industry dummies as controls.
Occupational dummies are based on International Standard Classification
of Occupations (ISCO-88) submajor groups (i.e., two-digit groups). Industry
definitions follow the European general nomenclature of industrial activities
(NACE Rev. 1). Industries are defined at the one-digit level, with two excep-
tions: manufacturing and transport and storage and communication, which
are disaggregated at the two-digit level. I also use age and age
 
2
 
 as additional
controls.
 
Results
 
I estimate a logit model for each of the five employee discretion variables
(order, methods, speed, breaks, and hours), using the explanatory variables
described in the previous section. Results from the baseline model are
shown in Table 3, which includes the estimated coefficients and changes in
probability.
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 Three high-performance work practices have a positive effect
on employee discretion. Performance pay contracts increase the probability
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 Changes in probability are defined as 
 
d
 
P = 
 
P
 
1
 
 
 
−
 
 P0, where P0 is the estimated probability at the
means of the explanatory variables, and P1 is the estimated probability when the variable of interest is
evaluated 1 standard deviation above its mean and all other variables are evaluated at their means. When
the variable of interest is a dummy, I report the estimated change in probability when the variable
increases from 0 to 1 (see Petersen (1985) for details).
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 TABLE 3
Logits for Employee Discretion
Order Methods Speed Breaks Hours
Performance pay 0.155** 0.266*** 0.143** 0.255*** 0.253***
(0.069) (0.070) (0.068) (0.066) (0.063)
[0.030] [0.046] [0.027] [0.059] [0.062]
Vertical communication 0.246*** 0.233*** 0.151** 0.220*** 0.141*
(0.072) (0.073) (0.071) (0.071) (0.075)
[0.050] [0.044] [0.030] [0.053] [0.034]
Improvement 0.145*** 0.153*** 0.211*** 0.111*** 0.139***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
[0.030] [0.029] [0.043] [0.029] [0.038]
Teamwork –0.025 –0.089* –0.061 –0.087* –0.005
(0.050) (0.051) (0.049) (0.048) (0.047)
[–0.005] [–0.016] [–0.012] [–0.021] [–0.001]
Job rotation 0.003 0.037 0.037 –0.136*** –0.059
(0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.045) (0.044)
[0.001] [0.007] [0.007] [–0.032] [–0.014]
Subordinates (1–4) 0.608*** 0.588*** 0.392*** 0.382*** 0.391***
(0.085) (0.087) (0.082) (0.076) (0.071)
[0.104] [0.093] [0.071] [0.086] [0.097]
Subordinates (5–9) 0.543*** 0.522*** 0.285** 0.445*** 0.467***
(0.129) (0.131) (0.120) (0.114) (0.104)
[0.093] [0.082] [0.052] [0.099] [0.116]
Subordinates (10+) 0.941*** 0.811*** 0.580*** 0.713*** 0.679***
(0.128) (0.127) (0.117) (0.108) (0.095)
[0.147] [0.119] [0.099] [0.152] [0.168]
Establishment size (2–4) –0.424** –0.430** –0.326* –0.105 –0.251*
(0.172) (0.176) (0.170) (0.161) (0.150)
[–0.089] [–0.084] [–0.067] [–0.025] [–0.060]
Establishment size (5–9) –0.608*** –0.513*** –0.439*** –0.498*** –0.576***
(0.171) (0.174) (0.169) (0.158) (0.149)
[–0.130] [–0.101] [–0.092] [–0.121] [–0.132]
Establishment size (10–49) –0.670*** –0.618*** –0.516*** –0.763*** –0.520***
(0.166) (0.170) (0.164) (0.154) (0.144)
[–0.138] [–0.118] [–0.105] [–0.183] [–0.123]
Establishment size (50–99) –0.704*** –0.655*** –0.500*** –0.759*** –0.522***
(0.174) (0.178) (0.172) (0.161) (0.151)
[–0.153] [–0.133] [–0.106] [–0.186] [–0.120]
Establishment size (100–249) –0.813*** –0.795*** –0.490*** –0.656*** –0.375**
(0.175) (0.179) (0.173) (0.163) (0.152)
[–0.179] [–0.165] [–0.104] [–0.161] [–0.088]
Establishment size (250–499) –0.706*** –0.738*** –0.541*** –0.667*** –0.497***
(0.185) (0.188) (0.182) (0.172) (0.162)
[–0.155] [–0.154] [–0.116] [–0.164] [–0.114]
Establishment size (500+) –0.732*** –0.846*** –0.484*** –0.684*** –0.400***
(0.176) (0.179) (0.174) (0.164) (0.154)
[–0.160] [–0.176] [–0.102] [–0.167] [–0.093]
Firm tenure 0.014*** 0.022*** 0.002 –0.006 –0.0004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
[0.017] [0.019] [–0.006] [–0.013] [–0.006]
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Job tenure 0.005 0.013** 0.009* 0.005 –0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
[0.0003] [0.004] [0.007] [0.010] [–0.003]
Firm tenure × Job tenure –0.0005** –0.001*** –0.0005** –0.00002 –0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Age 0.058*** 0.033** 0.011 0.048*** 0.001
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
[–0.013] [–0.001] [0.001] [0.018] [0.010]
Age2 –0.001*** –0.0004** –0.0001 –0.0005*** –0.00003
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Children –0.007 –0.037 –0.062** –0.005 –0.011
(0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030)
[–0.001] [0.007] [–0.012] [–0.001] [–0.003]
Female –0.134 –0.117 –0.275*** –0.543*** –0.262***
(0.083) (0.084) (0.081) (0.077) (0.076)
[–0.034] [–0.028] [–0.034] [–0.092] [–0.050]
Household size –0.009 –0.011 –0.008 –0.048* –0.002
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025)
[–0.002] [–0.005] [0.004] [–0.003] [–0.001]
Female × Household size –0.021 –0.019 0.052 0.078** 0.060**
(0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.031) (0.030)
Discrimination in establishment –0.002 0.012 –0.046* –0.113*** –0.050**
(0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
[–0.0003] [0.002] [–0.007] [–0.022] [–0.010]
Women’s participation 5.449*** 3.796*** 1.276*** 0.718*** 4.525***
(0.274) (0.276) (0.266) (0.255) (0.255)
[0.083] [0.055] [0.021] [0.015] [0.098]
Number of observations 11,960 11,958 11,917 11,964 11,934
Pseudo R2 0.120 0.102 0.053 0.106 0.088
Estimated probability 0.733 0.763 0.732 0.617 0.412
Note: The table reports estimated coefficients, standard errors (in parentheses), and changes in probability (in
brackets). Levels of significance: 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**) and 10 percent (*). All regressions include a constant
term, 24 industry dummies, and 26 occupation dummies. Changes in probability are in probability units, i.e., 0.030
means that the probability increases by 3 percentage points, for example from P0 = 0.560 to P1 = 0.590. For the
dummy variables, I report the change in probability when the variable of interest moves from zero to one. Otherwise,
I report the change in probability when the variable of interest increases by one standard deviation. To compute the
estimated probabilities, variables other than the variable of interest are evaluated at their means, with two exceptions:
for the interaction terms, I use the product of the means and for age2 I use the square of the mean. Finally, for the
tenure variables, I take into account that an increase in job tenure or firm tenure raises the interaction term (Firm
tenure × Job tenure). Likewise, the changes in probability for female and household size take into account the effect
on the interaction term, and the change in probability for age accounts for the effect on age2. For this reason, changes
in probability for the interaction terms and for age2 are not reported.
Order Methods Speed Breaks Hours
TABLE 3 (cont.)
of discretion over work methods (order, methods, and speed) and work
scheduling (breaks and hours). The effect on the work scheduling variables
is larger than the effect on the work methods variables: the estimated
changes in probability are 6 percentage points versus 3–5 percentage points,
respectively. Employees whose superiors are more open to receive and
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 implement suggestions also enjoy greater discretion than those with less
receptive superiors: the effects of the vertical communication variable are
always significant and raise the probability of discretion by 3–5 percentage
points for both work methods and work scheduling. Actual work improvement
also has a significant effect on all discretion variables and raises estimated
probabilities by about 3–4 percentage points. However, the results for the
two remaining high-performance work practices are insignificant or have
the “wrong” sign: teamwork does not have any significant effect on most
discretion variables and actually reduces discretion over methods and breaks
by 2 percentage points. Job rotation does not generally have a significant effect
either, and has a negative, 3-percentage point effect on discretion to take breaks.
The employee’s position in the organization has a large positive effect
upon discretion. Controlling for two-digit occupations, the probability of
having discretion is 7–10 percentage points higher for an employee with one
to four subordinates compared to an employee with no subordinates. For
an employee with ten or more subordinates, the probability of discretion is
10–17 percentage points higher than for an employee with no subordinates.
The coefficients for one to four and five to nine subordinates are not
statistically different from each other, but are statistically smaller than the
coefficient for more than ten subordinates. Occupational dummies, which
for the sake of concision are not reported, also indicate significant differences
in discretion between higher- and lower-level occupational categories.
For concision’s sake, coefficients for the industry dummies are not
reported in Table 3. Public administrations provide approximately the same
discretion over order, methods, and speed as employers from other industries.15
The picture is a bit different for the aspects of discretion that are more
related to work scheduling (breaks and hours): no industry gives signifi-
cantly more discretion over breaks than the public administration, and
twelve industries grant significantly less. For work hours, seven industries
grant significantly less discretion, and four industries grant significantly
more discretion than the public administrations. All in all, there is actually
very little difference between public administrations and other employers:
when the twenty-four industry dummies are replaced with a public administra-
tion dummy, the coefficient for that dummy is not significant for any of the
discretion variables except order (negative coefficient) and breaks (positive
coefficient). Moreover, in these two cases the estimated changes in probability
15 Controlling for the other explanatory variables, only three out of twenty-four industries grant
significantly less discretion over order and speed than the public administrations; and only one provides
significantly less discretion over methods. Most remaining industries grant the same levels of discretion
as the public administrations, and some of them grant significantly more.
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are very small (a 3-percentage point reduction for order and a 7-percentage
point increase for breaks).
Firm tenure has a positive effect on discretion over the order and methods
of work, and job tenure has a positive effect on discretion over methods and
speed of work. All other effects are insignificant. Besides, the effects that are
significant are very small: the change in probability that results from a 9-
year increase in firm or job tenure (which corresponds approximately to one
standard deviation) is just a 1–2 percentage point increase. These positive
coefficients may reflect firm- and job-specific human capital accumulation
that enhances ability and therefore leads to greater levels of discretion. Age
has a small positive coefficient, which is significant for discretion over order,
methods, and breaks, but age2 has a negative coefficient. Thus, the change
in probability due to a 1 standard deviation increase in age (about 11 years)
is negative for discretion over order and methods and positive for discretion
over breaks. In any case, the effects are always very small in absolute value
(less than 2 percentage points).
The interaction term between job tenure and firm tenure has a negative
effect on order, methods, and speed, and no significant effect on the other
two measures of discretion, which are more related to schedules. I have
conducted several tests to understand whether the interaction term is a
good proxy for ability. First, I estimate the logits of Table 3 separately for
each one-digit occupation. Given that more able employees should belong
to higher-level occupations, I expect the coefficient of the interaction term
to be smaller in these regressions (i.e., ability should be less important
within occupations than across occupations). I find that the interaction
term is in most cases insignificant within occupations.16 Second, I estimate
the logits of Table 3 with different sets of controls for the employee’s position
in the organization. If  employees of greater ability have higher positions in
the organization, and the interaction term is a good proxy for ability, then
its coefficient should increase when the employee’s position is less thoroughly
controlled for. Specifically, I estimate three variants of the model: a first
variant with the subordinate dummies and one-digit (instead of two-digit)
occupational dummies; a second one with the subordinate dummies and no
occupation dummies; and a third variant with neither subordinates nor
occupational dummies. Whereas in the baseline specification (Table 3) the
interaction term is significant only for the order and methods of tasks, in
16 In the estimations referring to the order of tasks, there is only one occupation (skilled agricultural
workers) out of ten for which the interaction term is significant; and in the estimations for the methods
of work the interaction term is significant within five occupations. In the regressions on speed, breaks,
and work hours, the interaction terms are significant for only two, three, and one occupation respectively.
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 variants one and two it is significant also for the speed of work, and in variant
three it is significant for all measures of discretion except one (breaks).
I have also checked whether the interaction term could be capturing something
other than ability. One possibility is that employees with longer job tenure
are people who particularly like their current job and hence do not want to
change. However, this interpretation does not explain why the interaction term
has a negative coefficient: if employees like to have discretion, it should be positive.
Another possibility is that longer job tenures are due to discrimination. That
could explain why the coefficients for the interaction term are negative: if
employees with longer job tenure are those who are being discriminated
against, and employees enjoy having discretion, longer job tenure must have
a negative effect on discretion. This possibility can be tested using question
31 of the EWCS, which tells us whether the respondent has suffered different
types of discrimination within the last year. I use this question to construct
six dummies, each for one type of discrimination and, based on this information,
I conduct several tests (to save space, tables are omitted). First of all, I test
whether the interaction term is positively correlated with these dummies,
and I find that all but one (the correlation with the age discrimination dummy)
are negative. In addition, I compute the correlation between sexual discrimina-
tion and the interaction term for female employees only, and the correlation
between age discrimination and the interaction term for different age groups.
As far as sexual discrimination is concerned, I still find a negative correlation
when the sample is restricted to female employees. However, for age discrimi-
nation I do find a negative correlation for older employees and a positive
one for younger employees. Second, I compute the correlations between the
discrimination dummies and the interaction term conditional on job tenure
and firm tenure. I regress the interaction term on job tenure, firm tenure, a
measure of discrimination, and a constant. I estimate this model for the six
discrimination types. In all cases except one (age discrimination), the coefficient
of discrimination is insignificant. For age discrimination the coefficient is positive
and significant, but becomes insignificant when age and age2 are introduced
in the regression. Finally, I test whether the negative coefficient of job
tenure × firm tenure is robust to the introduction of different discrimination
controls in the Table 3 logits. I try three different specifications, all of which
include the index for discrimination in the establishment and, in addition,
the dummy variables for discrimination against the respondent,17 but I see
no change in the sign or significance of the job tenure firm tenure coefficient.
17 I estimate three different variants. In the first one I just add the index of discrimination against the
respondent; in the second one I add the six dummies measuring different types of discrimination against the
respondent; and in the last one I add an interaction term between the female and sexual discrimination dummies.
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To sum up, although alternative explanations of the interaction term
based on job matching and discrimination are sound, I find very limited
evidence to support them.
The female dummy has a negative coefficient in the regressions for speed,
breaks, and hours (in the other regressions the coefficient is not statistically
significant). The female dummy reduces the probability of discretion over
speed and hours by 3–5 percentage points, and it reduces the probability of
discretion over breaks by 9 percentage points. Controlling for sex, household
size does not have any significant effect on discretion, and the number of
small children has an insignificant or even negative effect on discretion. The
interaction term between the female dummy and household size has a positive
coefficient in the regressions for breaks and hours. I have also estimated
other specifications with more interaction terms as explanatory variables
(female × children, female × household size, and age × children), but none
of those were significant. In addition, I have used other family-related
explanatory variables: two dummies for whether the respondent is the main
income earner in the household or the main person responsible for house-
keeping, and interactions of those two dummies with the female dummy.
The coefficients of all these variables are insignificant in the regressions for
the order, methods, and speed of work. Moreover, in the regression for
breaks, female × housekeeper has a negative coefficient, and the coefficients
for the other three variables are insignificant. In the regression for work
hours, being the main income earner has a negative effect on discretion, and
being the main housekeeper has a positive effect, but female × housekeeper
has a negative coefficient, which is larger in absolute value than the house-
keeper coefficient.
When I estimate logit equations separately for men and women, I find
that the effect of the family-related variables (number of children, household
size, and the dummies for being the main income earner or housekeeper) is
insignificant in most cases (see Table 4). Thus, in the regressions for order,
methods, and breaks, the coefficients of these four variables are insignificant
for both men and women. In the regression for the speed of work, these
variables are insignificant for men. For women, the size of the household
and the dummy for housekeeping have a positive effect on discretion over
speed, but the number of children has a negative effect and being the main
income earner has no significant effect. In the regression for work hours,
the four variables are insignificant for women whereas, for men, being the
main income earner and being the main housekeeper have a negative and a
positive effect, respectively.
I have also decomposed the male–female discretion gap using a specific
technique for nonlinear equations (Fairlie 1999, 2005) although, to save
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 space, these tables are omitted. I find that the number of subordinates
always contributes positively to the gap because women usually have fewer
subordinates and therefore less discretion than men. In contrast, occupation
and industry always contribute negatively to the gap, which suggests that
women work in industries and occupations where employees are given
TABLE 4
Logits for Employee Discretion, by Sex
Order Methods Speed Breaks Hours
Women
Children –0.035 –0.038 –0.141*** –0.024 0.013
(0.050) (0.051) (0.049) (0.047) (0.046)
[–0.007] [–0.007] [–0.028] [–0.006] [0.003]
Household size –0.030 –0.047 0.091** 0.040 0.027
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.036) (0.036)
[–0.008] [–0.011] [0.023] [0.013] [0.008]
Main income earner –0.012 –0.074 0.059 0.088 –0.110
(0.074) (0.076) (0.072) (0.069) (0.068)
[–0.002] [–0.014] [0.012] [0.022] [–0.026]
Housekeeper –0.084 –0.093 0.162* –0.114 –0.060
(0.098) (0.100) (0.093) (0.091) (0.089)
[–0.017] [–0.017] [0.034] [–0.028] [–0.014]
Number of observations 5,508 5,502 5,486 5,506 5,490
Pseudo R2 0.112 0.102 0.060 0.119 0.078
Estimated probability 0.718 0.746 0.713 0.535 0.397
Men
Children 0.013 –0.022 –0.025 –0.002 –0.017
(0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.043) (0.043)
[0.003] [–0.004] [–0.005] [–0.004] [–0.004]
Household size –0.009 –0.025 –0.015 –0.030 0.029
(0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034)
[–0.002] [–0.006] [–0.004] [–0.009] [–0.010]
Main income earner 0.064 –0.045 –0.045 –0.006 –0.172**
(0.091) (0.092) (0.090) (0.086) (0.086)
[–0.013] [–0.009] [–0.009] [–0.001] [–0.042]
Housekeeper 0.021 –0.067 0.026 0.081 0.196***
(0.079) (0.079) (0.078) (0.075) (0.073)
[0.004] [–0.013] [0.005] [0.018] [0.048]
Number of observations 6,423 6,422 6,393 6,429 6,415
Pseudo R2 0.141 0.114 0.059 0.093 0.111
Estimated probability 0.704 0.737 0.734 0.661 0.417
Note: The table reports estimated coefficients, standard errors (in parentheses), and changes in probability (between
brackets). Levels of significance: 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**) and 10 percent (*). Changes in probability are
estimated as in Table 3. In addition to the four variables reported in the table, all regressions include the following
explanatory variables: teamwork, job rotation, vertical communication, improvement, performance pay, 3 subordinates
dummies, 7 establishment size dummies, firm tenure, job tenure, firm tenure × job tenure, age, age2, discrimination in
establishment, women’s participation, a constant term, 24 industry dummies and 26 occupation dummies.
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greater discretion. Two other sets of variables—high-performance work
practices and establishment size—contribute significantly to the gap.
Women participate less in high-performance work environments than men
and have therefore relatively less discretion, but on the other hand women
work in smaller establishments, which contributes to their having greater
discretion than men. Male–female differences in tenure and age do not
significantly contribute to the discretion gap. Finally, the unexplained part
of the gap is always positive: with male coefficients, women would have
more discretion than they actually have. This is consistent with discrimina-
tion but may also be due to other reasons such as unobserved heterogeneity.
Moreover, the results indicate that the gap cannot be attributed to male–
female differences in observables. In fact, the occupational and industry
structure of the female labor force would imply greater levels of discretion
than the ones observed for male employees.
Table 3 also shows the effects of discrimination and the national rate of
female labor force participation. The existence of discrimination in the
workplace has a negative effect on discretion over speed, breaks, and work
hours, but no effect on the other two measures of discretion (order and
methods). When logits are estimated separately by sex, I find that the
effects on order and methods are insignificant for both men and women,
and that the effect on breaks is significant (and negative) for both. The
effects on speed and hours, however, are insignificant for men and
negative for women. This suggests that women are more subject to
discrimination than men. As far as female participation in the labor force
is concerned, the effect is positive on all aspects of discretion and, in the
separate regressions for men and women, the effects are usually positive
for both groups.18
Discussion and Conclusions
The view that employers are motivated by performance concerns
(hypotheses 1–4) finds strong support in the data. As far as hypothesis 1 is
concerned, there are mildly favorable results, since most “high-performance”
work practices have a positive influence on discretion, but others have an
insignificant or even a negative effect. Thus, vertical communication, work
improvement, and performance pay have a positive effect on all measures
of  discretion. The two remaining work practices—teamwork and job
18 The only exception is discretion over breaks, where the effect of female participation is positive for
men but insignificant for women.
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 rotation—do not generally have a significant effect on discretion, and when
they do, it is negative. Thus, teamwork and rotation have a negative effect
on discretion over breaks, and teamwork is negatively related to discretion
regarding work methods. The result for teamwork is particularly puzzling,
given that teams are considered a keystone of modern work organization,
and are often supposed to be self-managed. Hypothesis 2, which contends
that employees at higher positions enjoy greater discretion, finds more
substantial support in the data: the number of subordinates has a positive
effect on all measures of discretion. The main difference is between employees
who have no subordinates and those who have some, although I also find a
significant difference between employees with more and fewer subordinates.
In addition, the occupation dummies show that higher-level occupations are
associated with significantly higher levels of employee discretion, which is
also consistent with the hypothesis. The data are also consistent with the
view that employers give more discretion to employees of higher ability
(hypothesis 3), although two qualifications must be made. First of all, this
effect pertains only to some aspects of discretion related to work methods
(order, methods)—ability has no effect on discretion over the speed of work,
breaks, and work hours.
Second, the effect of ability tends to diminish when the employee’s job
position is more thoroughly controlled for. In particular, ability is usually
insignificant within most major occupational groups. This suggests that
ability matters more to the extent that higher-ability employees are promoted,
thus performing more discretionary jobs. Finally, hypothesis 4, that employees
of larger organizations have less discretion, is strongly supported by the
data. Establishment size has a negative effect on all aspects of discretion:
those primarily related to work methods as well as those that are mostly
related to work scheduling.
Evidence on family concerns is rather mixed. The hypothesis that a
higher rate of female participation in the labor force has a positive effect on
discretion for all employees (hypothesis 5a) is strongly supported by the
data, but there is no differential effect for men and women (hypothesis 5b).
It is not clear that employees with more compelling family obligations have
more discretion to organize their work schedules (hypothesis 6). Controlling
for other variables, female employees have less discretion than male employees
and, for both men and women, household size and number of children have
no significant effect on discretion. Being the main income earner or the
main housekeeper, or having a larger household has an insignificant effect
on discretion in most cases. These results are even less supportive of
hypothesis 6 if  we take into account that we are not controlling for sorting:
employees with more compelling family obligations may choose jobs that
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have more discretion, and in that case we would observe a stronger relationship
between family characteristics and discretion. On the one hand, the analysis
indicates that women work in smaller establishments and in industries and
occupations where discretion levels are relatively higher, which suggests that
there could be some sorting. However, sorting can be limited by the fact
that discretion is very related to the level of responsibility, which is usually
lower for women.
I do not find that larger or public organizations grant more discretion,
which contradicts hypothesis 7. Organizational size has a clear negative
effect on all types of discretion and, as far as public ownership is concerned,
evidence is inconclusive. I find that public administrations grant significantly
more discretion over breaks than other employers, but there is no significant
difference on discretion over work hours. Hypotheses 8 and 9 are instead
clearly supported by the data. Employees whose superiors are more open to
suggestions are more likely to enjoy discretion in all dimensions, and particu-
larly over breaks and work hours, which is consistent with hypothesis 8.
However, this could also indicate performance rather than family concerns,
since hypothesis 1 also predicts a positive effect of vertical communication
on discretion. As far as hypothesis 9 is concerned, the data show that
discrimination has a negative impact on discretion over breaks and work
hours. In addition, the nonlinear decomposition of the male–female discre-
tion gap shows that the unexplained part of the gap is always positive for
different measures of discretion, i.e., women would have more discretion if
their observable characteristics influenced discretion according to the male
coefficients.
The importance of performance concerns is consistent with Osterman
(1995), who finds work–family programs to be positively related to high-
commitment work practices, and little support for the view that work–
family programs are introduced as a practical response to the family needs
of employees. There are also some similarities with Wood et al. (2003).
Their analysis supports the “organizational adaptation” approach whereby
society puts pressure on management to implement work–family policies,
but management has some freedom to conform more or less actively to such
pressures. In line with these results, I find that employees whose superiors
are more open to listen to and to implement suggestions enjoy significantly
more discretion than the rest. Moreover, that is true not only for discretion
over work scheduling (breaks and hours), but also for discretion over work
methods (order, methods, and speed). The finding that discrimination has a
negative impact on discretion over work scheduling is also consistent with
Wood et al. (2003), who find that firms with equal opportunity policies are
more likely to adopt family-friendly management. The positive relationship
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 between performance pay and discretion is consistent with Nagar (2002);
and the finding that women enjoy less discretion than men has been previously
obtained by Golden (2001) with United States data.
There are also some differences with respect to previous literature. First,
according to Wood et al. (2003), larger organizations and those belonging
to the public sector use more family-friendly policies, whereas my analysis
indicates that both large and public-sector organizations grant significantly
less discretion than the rest. Goodstein (1994) finds that larger organiza-
tions are more family friendly, but finds no significant public-sector effect.
My analysis does not necessarily contradict those results because those
papers measure family friendliness through an index that includes various
types of benefits. Because of economies of scale, the cost of offering some
of those benefits, e.g., child care, can be smaller for larger organizations; but
jobs are still less discretionary in those organizations because, due to large
size, more formal controls, rules, and procedures are needed to prevent
employees’ opportunistic behavior.
Second, whereas most research on work–family issues deals with policies
that firms can introduce with no effective change in job design (for example
childcare benefits), I study the relationship with discretion as a job design
choice. I only find mixed evidence for the hypothesis that firms change job
design to help work–family balance. Although the labor force participa-
tion of women is positively related to discretion, it is not clear that the
employees’ family needs have an impact on job design. In fact, male–female
differences in industry affiliation and establishment size contribute to
increase discretion for females relative to males, but this is largely offset by
the fact that women hold lower-level positions and are less involved in
HPWS than men.
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